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Retooling Tax Subsidies for
Health Coverage
Over the past year, renewed interest has emerged,
both on Capitol Hill and among market-oriented think
tanks, in making major reforms to the health care
system by altering the federal tax code. The push for
change appears to be coming from two quarters. Recently, many economists and health policy analysts who
have long argued that the current tax system is unfair on
several counts and creates incentives for inefficiency
have joined forces to make the case for reform. Meanwhile, some members of Congress have renewed
discussions about reforming the taxation of the health
system. Some Republicans have gone as far as coupling
the idea of tax reform with an individual mandate to
purchase insurance in an effort to ensure that all Americans have access to care while maintaining competitive
markets for health insurance and health services.
Changing the federal tax system can mean many
things, even among people who think they are in
agreement when promoting a broad idea whose details
have yet to be ironed out. With this caveat in mind,
there appear to be at least three thrusts to these tax
proposals:





employers and unions play in organizing coverage, how
that role might be maintained if the tax system were
altered to make the system more efficient and equitable,
and what elements of the health care system might have
to be recreated if employment-based coverage declined
in favor of individual-based coverage.

CURRENT TAX TREATMENT
Federal tax law stimulates the consumption of health
care and health insurance over other goods and services
in several ways. Furthermore, within the health care
sphere, it favors health coverage paid for through
employers and unions over that paid for by individuals.
The most significant feature of the federal tax
treatment of health care is that health coverage provided
through employment is excluded from an employee’s
gross income in determining his or her tax liability.2 It
is also not considered for either the employee’s or
employer’s share of employment taxes (Social Security,
Medicare, and unemployment taxes) and may be
deducted as a business expense by the employer.
While employment-based group coverage is excluded from taxation, tax breaks for individually
purchased health insurance are far narrower. Taxpayers
who itemize their deductions may deduct unreimbursed
medical expenses, including insurance premiums, to the

Improving economic efficiency in the health system
by limiting the currently open-ended tax exclusion of
health benefits provided by employers and unions.
Retargeting tax subsidies from higher earners to
lower earners.
Removing the tax code’s bias toward employmentbased coverage and creating an at least equal tax
incentive for the purchase of individual coverage.1

Each one of these policy goals raises many technical
issues as well as political resistance. It is particularly
unclear from discussions to date what role would be
ascribed to employers and unions, which now sponsor
health coverage for most Americans, in a reformed
system in which tax subsidies might be tailored to
individuals. It is also unclear how the proposed changes
in tax policy relating to health care might comport with
discussions of broader tax reforms, such as shifting to
a consumption tax or flat tax.
This Forum session will examine the current tax
treatment of health coverage and health care spending
and explore the potential impact of proposed tax
reforms. Special attention will be paid to what role
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extent that they exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross
income,3 but only about 4 percent of all tax returns
claimed this deduction in 1996. The Congressional
Research Service points out that this tax deduction is
little utilized because, for most taxpayers, the standard
deduction is larger than the sum of itemized deductions.
Also, most people’s unreimbursed medical expenses do
not exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.
The tax system’s bias toward employment-based
health coverage is reflected by the difference in federal
“tax expenditures”4 between the tax exclusion for group
benefits and the deduction for individual expenses. The
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that, in
fiscal year (FY) 1998, federal tax expenditures due to
the exclusion from income tax of employer contributions for health insurance, medical care (including that
provided through cafeteria plans and flexible spending
accounts), and long-term care insurance amounted to
$51.4 billion. In contrast, the JCT estimates the tax
expenditures due to the medical expense deduction,
including long-term care expenses, to be $4.4 billion.
The Department of Treasury estimates federal tax
expenditures due to the exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance premiums and medical care
to be $71.5 billion in FY 1998. Tax expenditure estimates produced by the two branches of government
differ for many reasons, including different conceptual
assumptions and different methods of accounting. For
example, in estimating tax expenditures due to the
exclusion of employer-provided health coverage, the
JCT assumes that more deductions would be made
under the individual medical expenses category in the
absence of the exclusion, while the Department of the
Treasury does not, according to a treasury staff economist. In addition, the Treasury Department lumps
together the tax-exclusion of employer-provided
coverage and the self-employed deduction, described
below, when it reports its estimates of tax expenditures,
while the JCT reports tax expenditures for the selfemployed deduction as a separate item. Neither the
administration nor the JCT incorporates employment
taxes (such as those used to fund Social Security and
Medicare) in calculating tax expenditure estimates.
The Lewin Group estimates that “total federal tax
expenditures” for employer-provided health benefits
came to $96.1 billion in 1996. Of that total, $60.3
billion (62.7 percent) was related to income tax, $24.5
billion (25.5 percent) was related to Social Security
taxes, $6.9 billion (7.2 percent) to Medicare taxes, and
$4.4 billion (4.6 percent) to out-of-pocket deductions.

Lewin estimates that state tax expenditures for employer health benefits in 1996 came to an additional
$12.4 billion.
According to the Treasury Department, exclusion of
employer contributions for medical insurance premiums
and medical care generates more federal tax expenditures than any other tax break related to the income tax:
$76.2 billion in FY 1999, compared to $72.4 billion for
the exclusion of employer pension plan contributions
and earnings and $53.7 billion for the deductibility of
mortgage interest in owner-occupied homes.5
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has treated
employers’ contributions toward employees’ accident
and health insurance as nontaxable fringe benefits since
the income tax was first levied in 1913.6 Until 1943, the
IRS made no specific ruling about employer contributions for health plans, but rather took the general
position that most fringe benefits not paid in cash
should be excluded from taxation. When the government imposed wage and price controls during World
War II, more firms began offering fringe benefits to
compete for workers.7 After the War Labor Board ruled
that health and pension benefits did not count as wages,
the IRS declared that employer-provided health insurance was excludable from taxable income in 1943. (The
medical expense deduction dates back to 1942.) As the
economy grew rapidly in the post-war years, many more
firms began offering health benefits. Increases in tax
rates after World War II provided added incentive to
offer tax-excluded fringe benefits.
Under the current tax code, self-employed taxpayers
may deduct payments for health insurance in determining their adjusted gross income. In contrast to the
medical expense deduction, the self-employed deduction is not restricted to itemizers. The deduction is
limited to 45 percent of the amount paid for insurance
in 1998 and 1999, with the limits increasing as follows:
to 50 percent in 2000 and 2001, 60 percent in 2002, 80
percent in 2003 through 2005, 90 percent in 2006, and
100 percent in 2007 and thereafter. The self-employment deduction is not available for any month in which
the taxpayer or taxpayer’s spouse is eligible to participate in an employment-based health plan for which the
employer pays part of the cost. The JCT estimates the
tax expenditure in FY 1998 for this deduction to be
only $0.8 billion.
Health benefits provided through cafeteria plans and
flexible spending accounts are excludable from both
income and employment taxes. Federal law also allows
a limited number of medical savings accounts (MSAs)
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to be established by taxpayers who are either selfemployed or work for a small employer. Employer
contributions to MSAs are excludable from both
income and employment taxes, while individuals’
contributions are deductible for determining adjusted
gross income.

For these reasons, the short- and long-term effects of
a tax system that favors health insurance may be divergent. One way to mitigate the long-term cost effect
would be to limit the tax exclusion to a fixed amount.
However, in the short run, reducing the amount of tax
subsidy might increase the cost of health coverage for
employees, thereby causing more to be uninsured.

CRITICISMS OF CURRENT SYSTEM

Most of the cost of health care is paid for through
third-party insurance programs. Eugene Steuerle and
Gordon Mermin estimate that in 1996 only about onequarter of Americans’ health care spending was paid for
out of pocket. By their account, the nation spent about
$11,000 per household on health care that year. About
half this spending was financed indirectly through
higher federal, state, and local taxes to support government programs and to compensate for revenue lost due
to the tax treatment of health care. About $2,000 of the
total was paid indirectly through lost wages for
employer-provided health benefits.

Many analysts have criticized the tax exclusion of
employer-provided health coverage, especially on
grounds that it is creates market distortions and inefficiencies and is unfair in that it favors people in certain
work situations and those in higher income groups.
Economist Mark Pauly, for example, recently wrote that
the tax exclusion is “mistargeted” (being available only
through group coverage), “miscalibrated” (by offering
stronger incentives to be insured to persons in higher
tax brackets), and “open-ended” (encouraging the
consumption of health insurance at levels exceeding a
socially adequate amount).8

Costs
Subsidizing the purchase of health insurance
through the tax system at any point in time will lower
the cost of coverage and increase the ability of individuals to obtain it. In the long run, however, the effect of
such a subsidy, particularly if it is open-ended, may be
to increase health costs and, thereby, deny health
coverage to many who no longer may be able to afford
it. This long-term phenomenon may occur because,
when health benefits are favored by the tax code over
cash wages, employers and employees negotiating over
compensation face an incentive to increase health
benefits as opposed to wages; each dollar of untaxed
health benefits purchases a dollar’s worth of health
coverage, while each dollar of wages is reduced by the
tax rate. Over time, such an incentive structure, if openended, will favor the growth of health insurance as
opposed to cash wages as well as the inclusion of more
items in insurance packages. Greater amounts of health
insurance, in turn, can lead to greater utilization of
medical services and upward pressure on prices and
expenditures. In theory this occurs because once
insurance premiums are paid (or group coverage is
established), individuals consuming goods and services
do not pay the incremental cost of those services at the
point of utilization, thereby removing the incentive to
shop as prudently as they would for other types of
services. In addition, the fact that a third party is paying
may increase providers’ ability to raise price levels.

There is some empirical evidence to back up the
theoretical arguments that third-party payment causes
costs to rise. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment,
for example, demonstrated that increasing the level of
cost sharing in insurance plans decreased utilization of
services. Circumstantial evidence of the inflationary
tendencies associated with health insurance can be
found by examining long-term cost trends since 1970.
(By that time, employer-provided health insurance had
become conventional and the government had established the major federal health entitlement programs,
Medicare and Medicaid.) Since 1970, national per
capita health expenditures have always grown faster
than the underlying rate of inflation, though at a slower
rate in recent years. Real per capita growth in national
health expenditures averaged 4.5 percent from 1970 to
1980, 5.1 percent from 1980 to 1990, and 4.2 percent
from 1990 to 1993, but dropped to 1.5 percent in 1993
to 1996 and 2.6 percent in 1996 to 1998.9 According to
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA),
Office of the Actuary, it is conventional wisdom that the
slowdown in real growth rates has been due to the
increased use of managed care strategies by many
purchasers, particularly in the private sector. Nonetheless, questions remain about whether the shift to managed care can permanently reduce the growth rate.
HCFA projects that the real annual per capita growth in
national health expenditures will rise to 3.1 percent from
1998 to 2001 and to 3.4 percent from 2001 to 2007.
As costs have gone up, so have the number of
Americans without health insurance. The U.S. Census
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Bureau recently reported that there were 43.4 million
uninsured Americans in 1997, about 1.7 million more
than in 1996.10 About 16 percent of the population is
now uninsured, up from about 11 percent in 1980.11
Eighty-four percent of the uninsured are in families in
which at least one person is working, according to the
Employee Benefit Research Institute.

Equity
The current tax treatment of health care can be
viewed as unfair in many ways. The tax exclusion is
available to people offered health benefits by their
employers or unions, but not to those who work for
firms where such group coverage is not offered.12
Furthermore, the exclusion favors higher-income
workers. For one thing, higher-income families are
more likely to receive health benefits from their employers. Eighty-seven percent of individuals with family
income greater than 400 percent of poverty receive
employer-based insurance, while only 48 percent of
those between 100 percent and 200 percent of poverty
do. Also, higher-income families are more likely to
have more generous coverage and they face higher tax
rates, both of which increase the value of the exclusion.
According to estimates done by the Lewin Group,
federal tax breaks for health care were worth an average
of $918 per family in 1996. The subsidies amounted to
only about $63 per family for those earning less than
$15,000 and $288 for those earning $15,000 to
$19,999, while they were worth $1,767 for families
earning $75,000 to $99,999 and $2,059 for families
earning $100,000 or more.

Market Distortions
Another set of criticisms of the tax treatment of
health care is that it creates market distortions that leave
many Americans less satisfied than they otherwise
would be with their health plans. One distortion already
referenced is that the tax system favors the growth of
third-party payment, thereby increasing resources
dedicated to health care and reducing what society may
spend on other things. Another distortion, some economists argue, is that it is biased toward having people
receive benefits through their employers, who, in turn,
may limit their choices or simply not offer health
benefits at all.
An important questions in this context is what
policies might replace the tax exclusion of employerprovided health coverage if it were limited or eliminated and what market distortions such alternative
policies might entail. While the employment-based tax

subsidy system certainly is flawed, employers and other
group plan sponsors currently provide essential functions in the marketplace. These functions include the
pooling of risk, the administration of health plans
(including easy withholding of funds for premiums),
and, in some cases, the ability to negotiate with health
insurers, third-party administrators, and the providers of
medical services for better value. What institutions
might perform these functions if employers stopped
providing them is an open question.
One Treasury Department economist described the
tax exclusion of employer-provided coverage as “the
glue that holds the employer-based system together.”
This tax incentive is an important factor in leading
employers to offer coverage and employees to form risk
pools. It is difficult to predict how employers might
respond to a change in the tax treatment of health
benefits. If the tax incentive were reduced, many
employers might still offer health benefits to attract the
best available workers or simply because people generally expect them to provide health coverage, but many
might stop doing so.
Today, nearly two-thirds of the noninstitutionalized
population under age 65 receives employment-based
coverage. On average, large employers pay about 80
percent of its cost. Also, about 34 percent of people 65
and older had employer-based coverage in 1996, primarily as a supplement to Medicare.13 In the private sector,
about 125 million people are covered through about 2.5
million health plans organized by employers and unions
under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA). In the public sector, about 10
million federal employees, dependents, and annuitants
receive coverage under the Federal Employees Health
Benefits program, and roughly 20 million receive group
health coverage from state and local governments.
Under ERISA, private-sector employers or employee
groups (unions) may offer “welfare benefit plans,”
including health plans. While ERISA provides plan
participants with certain protections,14 the law grants
employers considerable flexibility with which to
organize and finance health plans. In keeping with the
voluntary nature of private-sector health coverage,
ERISA allows sponsors to terminate a health plan at
any time. In recent years, the adequacy of ERISA’s
consumer protections has come under question and has
led to fierce debate in the Congress about how to
bolster them, perhaps in part because many employers
have shifted to managed care plans, leaving employees
with less choice of providers and more barriers to
receiving services.15 The difficulty in resolving these
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issues may well be another factor that has brought some
members of Congress to consider alternatives to the
employer-based system. For example, some employer
representatives have testified that employers will stop
offering coverage if plan participants’ court remedies
are expanded. In general, employers argue that “overregulation” of health benefits will increase costs,
thereby reducing their ability to offer coverage.
In a recent book, Pauly points out that subsidizing
employer-paid health benefits through taxes “can lead to
excessive employer interference in the choice of the form
and amount of health benefits.”16 He goes on to posit:
With employees ignorant of the full cost of the benefit
they receive, their reactions appear to run to two polar
cases—either they ignore the details of their “free”
insurance17 or they discover to their alleged surprise
that the benefits are not as good as they thought. This
pattern, one may speculate, led many employers to
move aggressively into managed care and then caused
many employees to react in horror at finding that this
coverage was, in some dimensions, not as permissive
or accommodating as the more costly conventional
insurance coverage they were used to receiving.

While conditioning tax incentives on employment
creates distortions that may frustrate some employees,
it is important to note that the federal tax code provides
employers with ways to offer employees considerable
choice of nontaxable benefits, including health coverage. Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, created
by the Revenue Act of 1978, introduced several types
of tax-qualified flexible benefit plans, including those
offering employees a choice between at least one
qualified nontaxable benefit and one taxable benefit
including cash.18 Section 125 allows premium conversion plans (which allow employees to pay for group
health premiums through pretax salary reduction),
flexible spending accounts (which allow employees to
set money aside for qualified unreimbursed medical or
dependent care expenses through pretax salary reduction), and cafeteria plans (which must offer a combination of qualified nontaxable benefits and taxable
benefits or cash). Often established to respond to
individual employee needs, these plans are more
prevalent among larger employers. In 1995, for example, 54 percent of full-time employees surveyed in
medium and large private establishments were eligible
for cafeteria plans and/or flexible spending accounts.19
In 1994, 19 percent of full-time employees in small
private establishments surveyed were eligible for
cafeteria plans and/or flexible spending accounts.
If judged by whether people have access to health
coverage, the employment-based system produces

mixed results. People working in small firms, for
example, are much less likely to be offered health
coverage than those working for large firms. In 1996,
only 48 percent of firms with fewer than 50 employees
offered health insurance, compared to 91 percent of
firms with 50 to 99 workers and 99 percent of those
with 200 or more workers.20
Employers with predominantly low-wage employees
also are less likely to offer health coverage to their
workers than employers with higher-wage workers (but
the difference tends to diminish as firm size increases),
the General Accounting Office (GAO) reports. Among
firms with up to 50 employees, for example, only 19
percent of those where most workers earned less than
$10,000 offered health benefits, compared to 51 percent
of those where most workers earned at least $10,000 (a
difference of 32 percentage points). Among firms with
more than 200 employees, 87 percent of those where
most workers earned less than $10,000 offered health
benefits, compared to 97 percent of those where most
workers earned at least $10,000 (a difference of 10
percentage points).
It is difficult to determine to what degree firms that
offer health benefits structure their contributions to
“subsidize” premiums for particular groups of
employees—for example, shifting costs from lowwage workers to those earning more (or vice versa),
from younger employees to older, or from single
employees to those with families. However, it is
reasonable to assume that firms now internally distribute the cost of health premiums in a wide variety of
ways, thereby compounding the difficulty that health
and tax policy analysts face in projecting the impact
on households of curtailing subsidies for employerprovided coverage and moving toward a tax system
based on individual purchase of coverage.
Larger firms’ advantage in offering health coverage
and possibly in subsidizing it for low-wage workers
may result for several reasons. The larger the pool of
workers covered in an employer plan, the less variability there is in health care costs and the less need there is
to purchase insurance. The larger the pool, the lower
the costs of administering the plan and the greater the
bargaining leverage with service providers. The Hay/
Huggins Company, Inc., estimated that in 1988 average
administrative and other overhead costs exceeded 35
percent of premium for firms with fewer than 10
employees, compared to 12 percent or less for firms
with more than 500 employees.21 These added administrative costs may put some small firms at a disadvantage
with large firms in competing for workers.

7
ALTERNATIVES
As noted above, support for major reform of the tax
treatment of health care appears to be growing in two
quarters: among some academicians attempting to
influence public policy and among some lawmakers. In
July, a group of policy analysts and economists, organized under the rubric of “The Consensus Group,”
advanced a set of guidelines for replacing the tax
exclusion of employer-provided health benefits. According to these guidelines, assistance for purchasing
health coverage:






Should be limited to a fixed amount and not be
open-ended.
Should be provided directly to individuals (who in
turn could buy either individually or through
groups).
Could include tax credits or alternate financial
incentives adjusted to reflect risk or financial need.
Should not result in an increase in the tax burden for
the American people and could reduce taxes, particularly in the context of major tax reform.

Signatories of the Consensus Group’s “A Vision for
Reform: Consumer-Driven Health Care Reform,” dated
July 1998, include Grace-Marie Arnett of the Galen
Group, Bradley Belt of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Stephen Entin of the Institute for
Research on the Economics of Taxation, Robert Helms of
the American Enterprise Institute, John Goodman of the
National Center for Policy Analysis, David Kendall of the
Progressive Policy Institute, Robert Moffit of the Heritage
Foundation, Pauly of the University of Pennsylvania’s
Wharton School, Steuerle of the Urban Institute, and
Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute, as well as others.22
Limiting the value of the existing tax exclusion of
employer-provided health benefits can be accomplished
in several ways, including imposing a flat tax rate on the
total amount of employer payments for health care,
according to Steuerle and Mermin. Another way is to
cap the exclusion, a strategy that in some cases could
require the calculation of health insurance costs for each
employee. A tax cap could be designed, however, so that
companies contributing less than some “bright-line”
amount might avoid having to make such calculations.
Tax incentives directed at individuals could come in
the form of an expanded deduction or a tax credit.23
Expanding the current deduction has many limitations.
This approach would still favor those in higher tax
brackets and would give no help to those who earn too
little to have a tax liability.

Refundable tax credits in many ways resemble direct
subsidies for health insurance premiums such as those
proposed under the Clinton health reform plan and
many health reform bills during the 103rd Congress.
With a refundable credit, if the amount of allowable
credit exceeds a person’s tax liability, the difference is
payable to the individual. Many tax credit proposals
would provide subsidies to cover the entire cost of
health coverage for the poorest families, with subsidies
diminishing as income increases. As with any incomerelated subsidy, one issue that arises with refundable tax
credits is that they may create a disincentive to work for
some people as increased earnings lead to a reduction
in subsidy.24 Moreover, if tax credits covered only part
of the cost of a health plan, in a voluntary system many
people receiving credits would choose not to buy health
insurance. There is also the question of how well the tax
credit might keep pace with medical inflation.
A system of tax credits to buy health insurance also
presents administrative difficulties. For one thing, at
least at the beginning of such a regime, individuals
would receive the credits to purchase coverage only
when they filed tax returns during the year after they had
consumed the insurance, while health insurers typically
require premiums to be paid in advance. As Steuerle
suggests, however, employers could reflect the credit in
withholding if the subsidy were simple to calculate (for
example, if it were not income-conditioned). Another
way to overcome the timing problem would be for the
government to provide individuals with vouchers,
instead of tax credits, with which to purchase health
insurance.

CBO Simulations
In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
evaluated three illustrative options for changing tax
subsidies for employment-based health coverage: (a)
capping the tax exclusion, (b) eliminating the exclusion
altogether, and (c) replacing it with a refundable tax
credit.25 In general, the CBO noted that all three options
would offer potential gains in efficiency and all three
would generate additional costs related to administration and compliance. The overall distributive effects of
any of the proposals would depend on how the tax
revenues gained from the reforms would be spent. (For
example, revenue gains could be spent to reduce
government debt, to build roads, to subsidize health
coverage for the poor, or for other purposes.)
Capping the exclusion. In simulating effects of a cap,
the CBO assumed that the amount of health insurance
premiums that could be excluded from taxable income
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would be $4,000 for joint returns, $3,400 for heads of
households, and $1,600 for single returns—levels that
corresponded roughly to what employers typically
contributed toward health coverage for different size
families in 1994. The CBO estimated that caps at these
levels would raise tax revenues by about $18.9 billion
in 1994 ($12.4 billion in income taxes and $6.4 billion
in Social Security payroll taxes). Caps such as these
generally would increase average tax liability as incomes rose, ranging from virtually no change for the
lowest-income group up to a $540 tax increase for those
earning between $100,000 and $200,000.
Eliminating the exclusion. The CBO estimated that
repealing the tax exclusion would raise about $44
billion in income tax revenues and $30 billion in Social
Security payroll taxes in 1994, but that doing so would
fundamentally change the health system. In the absence
of providing an alternative subsidy, removing the tax
exclusion could cause a dramatic drop in the number of
people with health insurance. For example, the CBO
estimated that the number of people covered by health
insurance could fall by 16 percent to 26 percent if the
average price of insurance increased by 35 percent.
Establishing a tax credit. The CBO’s illustrative tax
credit option was designed to replace the tax exclusion
on a revenue-neutral basis in 1994. For very lowincome families, the credit would equal 100 percent of
premiums up to $1,775 for single returns, $4,425 for
joint returns, and $3,750 for head-of-household
returns, and it would be phased out for those with
incomes between one and three times the lowest
income level. A family with an adjusted gross income
of $25,000 in 1994, for example, would qualify for a
72.6 percent tax credit on premiums up to $4,425. The
CBO concluded that the illustrative tax credit would
expand insurance coverage by providing 100 percent
subsidies for the poor while giving people with moderate incomes an incentive to seek less expensive
insurance. The average family earning less than
$10,000 in 1994 would have a net reduction in taxes
of $740, while people in the highest-income categories
would pay more taxes and receive virtually no benefit
from the illustrative tax credit. As with any tax preference that is phased out as income rises, the tax credits
might cause people to work less and might discourage
spouses from entering the labor market.

INTEREST ON THE HILL
During the debate over national health care reform
early in President Clinton’s first term, many tax-reform

bills were introduced, including measures that would
cap the tax exclusion, eliminate it, or replace it with a
tax credit. After the demise of the Clinton health
initiative, interest in tax reform waned, with some
exceptions. Some members of Congress from both sides
of the aisle have recently shown renewed interest in
reforming the taxation of health coverage.
On the Democratic side, for example, Rep. Jim
McDermott (D-Wash.) has proposed providing tax
filers lacking employer-based health insurance with tax
credits of up to 30 percent of the cost of individually
purchased health insurance (H.R. 539). Almost 40
million non-elderly Americans who were either uninsured or bought individual policies during 1996 would
have been eligible for the proposed tax credit in that
year, according to the GAO.26
In recent months, some Republican members of the
House of Representatives have publicly broached the
idea, at least in general terms, of coupling tax reforms
with an individual mandate to purchase health insurance. In a September 9 speech at the Cato Institute, for
example, Rep. Bill Thomas (R-Calif.), chairman of the
health subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways
and Means, made such an overture after calling the
current combination of tax-favored, employment-based
coverage and various government programs “a rigged
game” that invariably works to the political advantage
of the Democratic party. Thomas argued that, under its
current structure, the health care system is inexorably
moving toward more government control as employer
coverage erodes due to rising costs and as lawmakers
face pressure to expand government programs and
market regulation in response. While this type of
dynamic has tended to put Republicans on the defensive
in one set of incremental reform discussions after
another, Thomas argued that the party instead should
attempt to take the high ground and try to reshape the
health system in a way that minimizes the amount of
government interference in the provision of health
insurance and medical care. If Congress were to change
tax incentives to move away from employer-provided
health benefits, Thomas added that changes would have
to be practical and many subsidiary issues would have
to be addressed. For example, new structures might be
needed to pool risk, provide information about health
benefits alternatives, and administer health benefit
programs.
Providing insurance through a mandate raises
difficult political issues. As evidenced during the debate
over universal health insurance five years ago, a mandate to purchase insurance immediately raises the
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question of subsidizing those who otherwise would not
buy it and arguably cannot afford it. Even if the government did away with the current tax system and reallocated $70 billion in tax breaks among 60 million
households not receiving Medicare, Medicaid, or other
direct public health benefits, only about $1,150 could
be provided per household in subsidy, Steuerle and
Mermin point out.27 More government support might be
needed to make a significant dent in the number of
uninsured. Steuerle and Mermin go on to say:
Even with some significant efforts at shifting expenditures and subsidies, however, it is highly unlikely that
we would have enough to cover most of the cost of
today’s more comprehensive insurance policies. This
has become the classic dilemma of health reform. The
system has become so expensive—in part because of
how inefficiently government spends all its health
care subsidies—that to raise hundreds of billions more
to fill gaps for the non-Medicare and non-Medicaid
population would require much higher tax rates and
would continue the conversion of the federal government into little other than a provider of health care
and pensions.

Barring an infusion of new spending, reallocating tax
subsidies to the poor would come at the expense of those
with higher incomes, who currently receive the greatest
benefits from the tax code and who have more clout with
elected officials. As evidenced during the Reagan administration, proposals merely to cap the tax exclusion of
employer-provided benefits (much less to eliminate it)
might draw strong resistance from employers, unions,
insurers, and those health providers who fear that their
services might be left out of insurance packages that could
shrink in response to smaller subsidies.
Moving the health system away from employers and
toward individuals raises the question of who would
organize coverage on behalf of individuals. Would
sponsorship organizations such as purchasing cooperatives have to be developed to do this? In the absence of
a group sponsor, how could individuals negotiate with
health insurers and providers? (Market-based think
tanks that advocate a system based on individual choice
often point to the federal employees program, which
offers several health insurance options in every area of
the country, as a model. This program, however, is the
largest employer-sponsored plan in the country.) If
individuals had to fend for themselves in the individual
market to purchase a federally mandated insurance
package, a key question would be what obligation the
federal government might have to regulate health
insurance (a market now under state authority) to ensure
that adequate policies were available, plan solvency
were maintained, and consumers protected from abuse.

Steuerle and Mermin propose a tax reform strategy
that would maintain a role for employers in administering health benefits, while it would (a) cut back the
value of the existing exclusion, (b) provide a tax credit
to individuals to buy health insurance, and (c) penalize
individuals with moderate or higher incomes who do
not purchase insurance.28 Noting that some employers
might be tempted not to sponsor health plans if tax
subsidies for group coverage were simply cut back, they
suggest that employers should be required to offer
health plans upon which tax credits might be spent,
though not necessarily required to contribute toward the
plans’ cost. They also suggest that employers reflect
credits and penalties in withholding.
Although support for overhauling the taxation of
health coverage according to principles described in
this paper appears to be building, recent activity in
Congress seems to be headed in the opposite direction—that is, extending tax benefits available through
employment-based health coverage. Republicansponsored patient protection legislation (H.R. 4250
and S. 2330), for example, includes measures that
would expand the availability of tax-advantaged
medical savings accounts, accelerate the health insurance deduction for the self-employed, and allow
carryovers and rollovers of unused benefits in cafeteria plans and flexible spending accounts.29

THE FORUM SESSION
The session will begin with three short presentations,
followed by a roundtable discussion involving several
panelists. Bob Lyke of the Congressional Research
Service will begin by outlining the current tax treatment
of health care and summarizing recent congressional
activity. Economists Mark Pauly and Eugene Steuerle
then will discuss the rationale for reforming the taxation
of health care as well as ideas on how to do it. Both also
will address the role employers and unions currently
play in organizing coverage for employees and how that
role might change if tax subsidies were geared more
toward individual purchase of health insurance. The
panel will include Harry Conaway of William M.
Mercer; Jim Ray of Connerton & Ray; Sonia Conly of
the Department of the Treasury; and John Meagher,
special counsel, House Committee on Ways and Means.

Issue Questions
Discussion will address the following questions:



What would be the likely effects, both in the short
and long run, of capping or eliminating the exclusion
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from taxation of employment-based health coverage? Over time, would such reforms help control the
growth of health care expenditures by reducing the
incentive to receive compensation in the form of
health insurance?








What would be the effect of replacing the tax
exclusion for employment-based health coverage
with refundable tax credits for individuals? What
are the options for designing such a policy and what
major issues arise (for example, political opposition,
administrative feasibility, budgetary constraints)?
What might be the impact in the labor market of
refundable tax credits that diminish in value as
income rises?
What are the strengths and the weaknesses of
employment-based health coverage? If the tax
incentives are changed to encourage individual
coverage, what other policy reforms might be
necessary? Would other sponsorship organizations
have to be developed? Would the federal government face more pressure to regulate the individual
insurance market, especially if tax reforms were
coupled with an individual mandate?
How might changing the tax treatment of health
care fit into broader tax reform strategies?

Speakers and Discussants
Bob Lyke is a specialist in social legislation at the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library
of Congress. He was educated at Swarthmore College,
Balliol College (Oxford), and Yale, where he earned a
Ph.D. degree in political science. After teaching at Bryn
Mawr and Princeton, he began working at CRS in 1975,
initially on school finance issues. Currently, his work
focuses on tax issues involving education and health
care. He is a certified public accountant and has taught
tax accounting courses at the University of Maryland
since 1993.
Mark V. Pauly, holds the positions of vice dean of
the Wharton Doctoral Programs, Bendheim Professor,
and chair of the Department of Health Care Systems.
He is professor of health care systems, insurance, and
risk management and public policy and management at
the Wharton School and professor of economics in the
School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania. One of the nation’s leading health economists,
Dr. Pauly has made significant contributions to the
fields of medical economics and health insurance. His

1968 article on the economics of moral hazard continues to serve as a benchmark in the medical insurance
field concerning the effect of insurance coverage on the
use of medical care services. He has analyzed Medicare
and Medicaid financing, the impact of methods of
paying health care providers on their behavior, and the
role of employment-related group insurance.
C. Eugene Steuerle is a senior fellow at the Urban
Institute, where he conducts extensive research on
budget and tax policy, health care, Social Security, and
welfare reform. In the area of health, he has published
several articles on issues such as financing of health
care, the use of mandates, and the economic effect of
tax subsidies. Earlier in his career, he served in various
positions in the Treasury Department under four different presidents and was eventually appointed deputy
assistant secretary of the treasury for tax analysis.
Harry J. Conaway is a lawyer and the head of
William M. Mercer’s Washington Resource Group,
which analyzes legislative and regulatory issues of
importance to sponsors of pension and health plans. The
group analyzes tax, ERISA, and employment law; assesses plan compliance with tax and other legal requirements; develops plan designs and administration strategies; and provides government relations assistance. Prior
to joining Mercer, he was associate tax legislative counsel
in the Office of Tax Policy of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury. In this capacity, he represented the administration on major employee benefits legislation and worked
on a variety of regulations affecting employee benefits.
Sonia Conly is a financial economist in the Office
of Tax Analysis at the Department of the Treasury. She
is primarily responsible for Treasury Department
estimates of the direct and indirect effects on federal
budget receipts of health policy changes. She has
followed the literature and analyzed data on employer
health insurance since the early 1980s.
John K. Meagher was named special counsel to the
staff of the House Committee on Ways and Means in
February 1998. His primary responsibilities are to
coordinate work of the committee associated with
“fundamental tax reform” and to serve as the committee’s liaison to groups as part of its effort to abolish the
income tax. Previously, Mr. Meagher was the managing
director of the Tax and Trade Group at Cassidy &
Associates, Inc., as well as a senior vice president of the
firm. He served as Republican minority counsel to the
committee from 1972 to 1981 and as assistant secretary
of the treasury for legislative affairs in the Reagan and
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Bush administrations. In 1991, he was appointed a
member of the Advisory Council on Social Security.
James S. Ray is a name partner in Connerton &
Ray, a law firm based in Washington, D.C., where he
leads the employee benefits practice group. Mr. Ray’s
practice includes establishing benefit plans and labormanagement organizations, counseling benefit plans,
plan fiduciaries, and labor organizations, litigation,
legislative representation, alternative dispute resolution,
and negotiations.
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